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STUDENT Noms
GIFTs OF BANK DE~osrs.-In Collins v. Collins' Admr., 242 Ky. 5,
45 S. -W (2d) 811 (1931), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
where a father deposits money in a savings account in, the names of
his infant children, with their knowledge and assent, and amid cir-
cumstances which-show he intended the money to go to them; but re-
tained the passbooks and exercised domimon over the funds by diaw-
ing checks in the children's names signed by himself, the acceptance
of the gift by the infants was presumed since it was beneficial-to them
and a completed gift results.
Thus according to this case it is sufficient for a completed gift
that the donor intends to make the gift and the donee knows of and
accepts it when the money has been deposited in his name, no delivery
of the passbook being necessary. The universal rule that there must
be a delivery of the res to complete a gift is here complied with by
the deposit of the funds in the name of the donee coupled with the
donative intent on the part of the donor. Intention on the part of the
donor to give the money deposited in the bank to the donee is an indis-
pensable element. Combs v. Roark's Admr., 221 Ky 679, 299 S. W 576
(1927), Trevathan's Executor v. Dees' Executors, 221 Ky. 396, 29&
S. W 975 (1927). The presumption of intention to make a gift, which
naturally arises from the deposit of money in another's name without
showing any intent, will prevail unless rebutted by countervailing evi-
dence. There are no Kentucky cases directly on this point but the
principal case of Collins v. Collins' Admr., supra, adopts by Way of
dictum the reasoning of Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297; Gaffney's Estate,
146 Pa. 49, 23 At. 163 (1892). It is also necessary that the donee know
of and accept the gift, although as said above, in the case of infants
the acceptance of the gift is presumed if they know of it and it is bene-
ficial to them. On this point Peters' Admr v. Peters, 224 Ky 493, 6
S. W.. (2d) 499 (1928), held that where a father deposited money in a
bank in his son's name but the son was never notified of it or de-
livered the passbook or deposit slip, but learned of it only after his
father's death, no valid gift was made.
The general rule, is that where the deposit is made in the donee's
name, the intention of the donor to make a gift must be in some way
manifested. Notification of the gift to the donee is the usual way of
manifesting such intent and is sufficient to render the gift complete,
whereas it would not be on the mere deposit of the funds in the donee's
name. But this element in addition to mere deposit may be supplied
by something other than notification to the donee, so that such noti-
fication is not necessary if there are additional elements sufficient to
show the intent of the donor. Harmson v. Tatten, 53 N. Y. App. 178, 85
N. Y. S. 725 (1900), Boone v. Citizens' Savzng- Bank, 84 N. Y. 83
(1881),. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 (1878), 3 Ruling Case Law, Sec
348.
As distinguished from the cases in which the funds given were
deposited in the name of the donee, there are several cases in Ken-
tucky in which they were deposited in the donor's name and he gave
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the donee the deposit, usually while on his death bed, by delivering
the passbook over to the donee. Such cases always require a delivery
of some sort. In one case of this kind, Weber v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327,
148 S. W 34 (1912), it was said, "The rule in regard to delivery is
that there must be an actual, constructive, or symbolical delivery of
the property in question in order to make it a valid gift." In this case
it was held that the delivery to the donee of an order to the cashier
of the bank to surrender the money deposited to the donee was a suffi-
cient delivery to validate the gift. Another such case, Burge v. Burge's
Admr., 25 K. L. R. 979, 76 S. W 873 (1903), held that it was a valid
gift where money was deposited in the name of the donor and he de-
livered a certificate of deposit to the depositee and told him to pay
the money to the donee. In another case, McCoy's Admr v. McCoy,
126 Ky. 783, 104 S. W 1031 (1907), in which the donor delivered her
passbook to the donee on her death bed, it was said that such a. gift
was valid whether it was treated as a gift snter vivos or a gift causa
mortis. However in this connection it must be remembered that gifts
causa mortis, that is, gifts made in anticipation of death, which would
not otherwise be made, are always contingent upon the donor dying
within a reasonable time and from the anticipated cause.
There is one case in Kentucky contra to these, Ashbroolk v. lRyan3's
Admr., 2 Bush 228 (Ky. 1867), in which it wa's held that the delivery
of the passbook to the donee while the donor was on his death bed,
was not sufficient to constitute a valid gift causa mortis. But this is
an old case and does not give its reasons for the decision, and ap-
parently has been overruled.
The above cases requiring delivery have all been cases in which
the deposit was in the name of the donor. In Collins v. Collins' Admr.,
supra, no derivery was requsred but the money was deposited in the
name of the donee. There is an old Kentucky case directly supporting
this decision: Everso7e v. First National Bank, 21 K. L. R. 244, 51 S.
W. 169 (1899), in which it was. held that where the donor deposited
funds in the bank in the donee's name and with his knowledge, but
retained the passbook himself and told the cashier not to pay it out
without the donor's assent, this constituted a valid gift -nter vzvos.
The deposit of the funds in the name of the donee with his knowledge
divested the donor of all legal control of the funds.
Thus the prevailing rule in Kentucky as reduced from these
cases is:
1. When the deposit is in the name of the donor it Is essential
to constitute a valid gift that there be a delivery of the passbook or
other writing to the donee or to a third person, and that the donor
clearly manifest his intention to make the gift. It is not essential that
the donee know of it In cases of delivery to a third person. This ap-
pears to be a good rule and is the general rule followed throughout
the United States: Culpepper v. Culpepper, 18 Ga. App. 182, 89 S. E.
161 (1916),. Wade v. Edwards, 23 Ga. App. 677, 99 S. E. 160 (1919)
In re Rusk's Estate, 210 N. Y. S. 588 (1925), Hudson v. Gleason, 171
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Wis. 238, 177 N. W 14 (1920). It is undesirable that delivery of the
passbook or certificate of deposit be dispensed with here because in
the usual case the donor's lips have been silenced oy death before the
question comes before the courts and for this reason it is necessary to
scrutinize both the delivery and the intention of the donor carefully
in order to prevent dishonest practices. Yet this should not be carried
to the point of adding a long string of technical requirements to the
successful completion of a gift, particularly gifts causa mortis, as com-
mon experience has shown us that it is an ordinary human failing to
neglect provisions and transactions in anticipation of death until the
last hour makes unheeded apprehensions grow certain.
2. When the deposit is in the name of the donee, it is not essential
for a valid gift that there be- any delivery of the passbook if the
donee has knowledge of the gift and the donative intent of the donor
can be shown. This situation is less frequently found, but where it
has developed, the above rule seems to have been followed. McKiinnon
v. FirstNational Bank, 77 Fla. 777, 82 So. 743 (1919), Turner v. Mc-
Manus, 38 R. I. 35, 94 Atl. 667 (1915), in addition to the two Kentucky
cases cited above have followed it. The difference in this situation and
the rule governing it from that in No. 1 is that the deposit in the name
of the donee serves as the delivery and no delivery of the passbook
or other evidence of ownership is necessary. However the mere fact
of deposit in the donee's name alone is not sufficient, but must be ac-
companied by knowledge on the part of the donee that the deposit was
made in his name. This is an important element, not only in com-
pleting the requirements of delivery, but perhaps also in justifying
such a case as Collins v. Collins' Aimr., supra, in which the donor
continued to exercise dominion over the funds after depositing them in
the donee's name; in which case it may be held that any dominion
which the donor exercised over the funds after the donee knows of
the deposit in his name, is illegal and of no effect, and therefore such
illegal exercise of dominion has no effect on the validity of the gift.
This was the reasoning of the court in the principal case. In all
gift cases the intention of the donor is an important consideration,
and if it can be clearly discovered, should, perhaps, be given more
'weight than any other element.
JOsEPH D. WEBB.
MuNcIPAL CORPOnATIONS-LIAsILITY ON I PLIED CONTRAcT.-G had
a contract to pump water from his mine into a city reservoir for which
the city promised to pay one hundred dollars per month. G decided to
cease operating the mine, so the city made a new contract to pay
twenty dollars a day if G would continue to furnish the water until
the city could make other arrangements. The contract was held to be
invalid. (Probably because not passed by city ordinance.) This was
the case of Gugenheim v. City' of Marion, 242 Ky 350, 46 S. W (2d)
478 (1932), in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that G
